However, funds raised and spent by PACs are subject to federal limits. An election used to narrow the field of candidates for a given elective office or to determine the nominee for a political party ahead of a general election. The process of dividing the seats in the U. House of Representatives among the 50 states. Reapportionment occurs every 10 years based on population changes recorded in the United States census. The process of defining electoral district boundaries. Districts are redrawn every 10 years following completion of the United States census.
In 25 states, federal district boundaries are determined primarily by the state legislature, sometimes subject to approval by the governor. In other states, independent or bipartisan commissions are tasked with setting or proposing district boundaries.
Redistricting also occurs at the state and local levels. However, contributions to super PACs are not subject to federal limits. More Caltech Voting and Elections Coverage. How Do Political Polls Work? How Does Campaign Funding Work? Taking away the right to vote from a person or group. Exit Poll. Electoral College. Testing should be conducted on all election machines and equipment, including e-poll books, on multiple occasions prior to the start of early voting and Election Day.
Testing should be carried out with appropriate public notice and in a public forum in an effort to increase transparency and public confidence in the electoral process. Critically, testing must be completed with enough time to allow for effective remediation.
Any abnormalities should be reported immediately to officials overseeing election administration and security, and they should be shared between states, localities, and federal agencies to alert other election administrators to potential threats.
Additionally, in order to understand the full extent of election-related risk, vulnerability analysis should be carried out continuously on all election machines and voter registration databases. Once conducted, states will be better positioned to assess where government resources should be allocated and plan for preventative measures and strategies.
Vulnerability analysis should be carried out by qualified, impartial professionals, rather than election equipment vendors or election administrators, who may have an interest in minimizing shortcomings in election machines and downplaying election vulnerabilities.
States too can conduct regular vulnerability assessments on their election infrastructure. Some states—including Maryland and Washington—have employed their Air National Guard to conduct cybersecurity testing on public networks. Suspicious findings should be reported immediately to federal agencies and to other state and local election officials around the country.
The federal government could incentivize such analysis via grant programs, including those that exist at DHS, and Congress should explore whether such programs are sufficiently flexible and resourced to support these efforts. To gain an overall appreciation of the risk to our election systems, the vulnerability assessments discussed above must be matched with information sharing that includes comprehensive threat assessments.
For example, information-sharing organizations such as the state-run intelligence fusion centers and the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers ISACs have enjoyed some success, whether in the counterterrorism or the cybersecurity context.
More broadly, the U. For example, Congress should urge the IC to prioritize collection and dissemination of information pertaining not just to cyberthreats but also to specific threats to elections and election systems, ideally through the National Intelligence Priorities Framework—which sets priorities for the entire IC—with the goal of making this intelligence shareable with state and local officials, via the FBI or DHS, in both classified and unclassified formats.
The U. State officials who have appropriate security clearances should also be provided with regular classified briefings on cybersecurity threats and system vulnerabilities. The ability to share information and synchronize responses in real time is essential to protecting U. Federal bodies and state officials are already coming together to address the issue.
In July , the Election Assistance Commission EAC in coordination with DHS, hosted a two-day meeting with election administrators and stakeholders from around the country to address threats to election infrastructure. Coordinated partnership between levels of government—especially as related to voting and elections—has not always been conducted in the most efficient or effective manner.
For example, some state officials voiced frustration after first learning that their state may have been one of those targeted by Russian operatives during the elections through testimony given recently by DHS officials before Congress. The See Something, Say Something campaign or the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative may offer guidance to set up public education campaigns in the context of election security. Election vendors, for example, should be required to provide notice to states in the event that their systems are hacked, in order to prevent potential problems from arising during elections.
The role of federal agencies in protecting election security does not constitute a federal takeover of election administration.
As aptly described by Sen. Updating outdated election infrastructure, conducting mandatory audits, and putting in place minimum cybersecurity standards and testing is essential and requires resources. It is the responsibility of Congress to defend American interests and ensure that our elections, which are central to a functioning democracy, are free, fair, and secure. The federal government and Congress have a duty to allocate funding and assist in the implementation of measures to guard against disruptions in future elections, at the very least in federal elections.
This would not be the first time that Congress provided funds to upgrade election infrastructure. In the presidential election, antiquated punch-card voting machines resulted in thousands of lost and uncounted votes. Steny H. Congress must act now to pass legislation that, contingent upon the adoption of best practices, provides state and localities the necessary funding to:.
In addition to offsetting the cost burdens on state, county, and municipal election administrators—many of whom simply cannot afford to update and secure election machines and databases—federal funding can stem inequity resulting from uneven municipal operating budgets. When state and local jurisdictions are held solely responsible for purchasing new voting machines or providing other updates to their election systems, it is often the case that richer, majority white communities receive newer, more reliable machines and upgraded security measures.
In , Russia exhibited both the skill and determination to cause problems and sow distrust in U. It is safe to assume that Russia is right now strategizing its next plan of attack, honing its abilities to infiltrate sensitive state and federal election machines and databases without detection and to maximum effect.
It is critical that we begin building our defenses to protect against election intrusions before it is too late. Igor Volsky , Michele L. Replace old voting machines. Conduct robust postelection audits to confirm election outcomes. Update and secure outdated voter registration systems and e-poll books. Require minimum cybersecurity standards for voter registration systems and other pieces of voting infrastructure. Perform mandatory pre-election testing on all voting machines, as well as continuous vulnerability analysis.
Expand threat information sharing, including comprehensive threat assessments accompanied by mandatory reporting requirements. Elevate coordination between states and federal agencies on election security, including real-time notification of security breaches and threats.
Provide federal funding for updating election infrastructure. Require voter-verifiable paper ballots or records for every vote cast Voting machines that record votes and tally them are run on software that is vulnerable to cyberintrusions. Replace old voting machines Much has been written about the dismal state of voting machines.
Here is what that looks like:. After the ballots are first counted in each precinct, often by volunteer poll workers with various levels of experience and training , those totals are transmitted in person to a secure location. Then, totals are added up for the ward, city, county and the state level. The ballots themselves — or devices with ballot totals like voting machine cartridges — are brought by precinct workers to a secure location.
Sometimes, because of human error, a small number of ballots — typically one precinct or less — may be temporarily misplaced: for example, one ballot box or one cartridge. When they are recovered, the initial vote count will be adjusted.
In all of these ways, a final preliminary vote count is generated. After the initial vote tabulation, there is a period when the results can be challenged for various reasons and a recount requested. In some jurisdictions, a recount may be mandatory when the winning margin falls within a certain small range. All of these procedures must take place in a period from 30 days after the election to when the state legislature next convenes and the secretary of state certifies the results as final.
The vote totals again have a chance of changing — typically by a small amount — but hardly anyone pays attention to these final adjustments. One final note: For decades the Associated Press provided county-level vote totals to news agencies on election night. But starting this November, there will be two major exit poll operations and associated systems for collecting and disseminating the county-level votes.
The Associated Press will partner with Fox News, while Edison Research, which has been responsible for the National Election Pool , the exit poll conducted for a combine of major news organizations since , will tabulate raw vote totals as well.
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